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RURAL-URBAN MIGRATION, URBAN UNEMPLOYMENT AND UNDEREMPLOYMENT, AND JOB
 
SEARCH ACTIVITY IN LDCs
 
Cary S. Fields
 
December, 1972
 
In recent years, the urban areas in less developed countries have grown
 
very rapidly. Between 1950 and 1960, urban areas in Africa grew by 69%, in
 
Latin America by 67%, and in Asia by 51%, while rural areas grew by only 20%
 
over the same period. Since biological growth rates rarely exceed 3% per
 
annum, much of the urban growth is due to rural-urban migration.
 
There is a growing consensus on a number of aspects of the migration ques­
3
tion. Both economists 2 and non-economists agree that rural-urban migration
 
can be explained primarily by economic factors: the "push" from agriculture
 
and the "pull" of relatively high urban wages. The "bright lights of the city"
 
and other cultural explanations are given relatively little weight in the
 
literature. There is also agreement that such migration is quite rational
 
despite the existence of urban unemployment. The essence of this relationship
 
is summarized clearly in perhaps the best-:mown article on the subject, that
 
of Harris and Todaro: " ... migration proceeds in response to urban-rural
 
differences in expected earnings (defined below) with the urban employment rate
 
acting as an equilibrating force on such migration."4 Finally, it is agreed
 
that young persons are most likely to migrate5 and that they experience much
 
higher rates of urban unemployment than other workers. 6 The reasons for the
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greater propensity of the young to move to economicrily advantageous areas
 
have been discussed by a number of writers7 and will not be repeated here.
 
In this paper, we shall present a formal theoretical mode with which to
 
analyze the equilibrium allocation of the labor force between labor marketg.
 
Our basic premise is that the same kinds of forces that explain the choices
 
of workers between the rural and urban sectors can also explain their choices
 
between one labor market and another within an urban area and are probably
 
made simultaneously. The decision-makers 
-- be they individuals or family
 
units ­ are presumed to consider the various labor market opportunities
 
available to them and to choose the one which maximizes their expected future
 
income.
 
Our point of departure is the received theory of rural-urban migration
 
in less developed countries, which is the model of Harris and Todaro 
(1970).
 
We begin by summarizing the basic features of the model. 
While we accept the
 
basic approach, we show that the particular implication of the model with re­
spect to the equilibrium urban unemployment rate substantially overstates the
 
rates actually observed by Turnham (1970) and others. We then extend the analysis
 
to take into account a number of important factors which have previously been
 
neglected--a more generalized approach to the job search process, the possibility
 
of underemployment in the so-called urban "murky sector," preferential treatment
 
by employers of the better-educated, and consideration of labor turnover--and
 
demonstrate that the resulting framework gives predictions closer to actual ex­
perience.
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1. The Received Theory of Rural-Urban Migration
 
The received theory of rural-urban migration, first set forth in Todaro
 
(1968), has been revised and augmented by Todaro (1969), Harris and Todaro
 
(1970), again by Todaro (1971), and by Johnson (1971). The Rarris-Todaro ver­
sion is best known and we shall consider it in that form.
 
The '.iodel treats rural-urban migration primarily as an economic phenomenon.
 
In essence, the theory postulates that workers compare the expected incomes in
 
the urban sector with agricultural wage rates and migrate if the former exceeds
 
the latter. Rural-urban migration is thus the equilibrating force which equates
 
rural and urban expected incomes and as such is a disequilibrium phenomenon.
 
The three basic characteristics of their model--tha migration occurs
 
largely for economic reasons, that the migration decisio depends on expected
 
rather than nominal wage differentials, and that migration takes place in dis­
equilibrium--suggest that rural-urban migration be given a new emphasis. Rather
 
than considering it as a key phenomenon in its own right, migration could better
 
be regarded as the adjustment mechanism by which workers allocate themselves
 
between different labor markets, some of which are located in urban areas and
 
some in rural areas.
 
Harris and Todaro formulate the problem in the following way. Let Wa and 
Wu respectively denote the nominal agricultural and urban wage rates, Eu be 
the number of urban jobs, and Lu be the urban labor force. The expected urban 
(i ~ - w uuu ) u 
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Expected rural income (E(Wa)) is simply Wa. 
The amount of rural-urban migration
 
(L) is a function of the urban-rural expected wage differential
 
()u 
- ( (Wu) - (a
 
The rural-urban equilibrium condition
 
(3) E(W) E(Wa)
 
becomes
 
(4) 	 Wu E = W 8
 
L- a
 u 
and the equilibrium employment rate is
 
(5) Eu W4 
L W
 
u u
 
How does this prediction square with available empirical evidence? 
Not
 
well. Per capita incomes in urban areas 
are anywhere from two to eight times
 
9
as high as in rural areas. Thus, Harris-Todaro would predict urban employment
 
rates of 1/2 to 1/8. 
 Yet the highest unemployment rate observed in seventeen
 
less developed countries is 20%. 1 0 
 While it might be argied that equilibrium
 
has not yet been reached, it seems much more likely in light of the size of the
 
gap between actual and predicted unemployment rates tfat the theory as 
stated 
needs to be amended to conform more closely to the observed facts. This is 
our
 
task in the remaining sections.
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2. A More Generalized Formulation of the Job Search Procese
 
In the Harris-Todaro model, the probability of obtaining an urban job is
 
defined as the number of urban jobs divided by the urban labor force. Impli­
citly, this specification assumes that persons living itn rural areas haV3 no
 
chance whatever of finding urban jobs. In this section, we shall show that the
 
Harris-Todaro specification implies a higher equilibrium unemployment rate than
 
would be predictdd by a more generalized formulation of the job search process.
 
There are several reasons why rural residents would ba expected to have a
 
positive chance of obtaining urban jobs. Much urban hiring is done through
 
channels which do not exclude rural residents. Some jobs are "advertised" and
 
filled informally by word of mouth. An urban resident may locate a job for a
 
friend or relative and then send word (and money) for him to come to the city.
 
Other jobs are filled by a central labor exchange with which rural residents are
 
able to register. Finally, those persons in rural areas proximite to cities may
 
on occasion be able to look actively for an urban job.
 
However, a number of factors make it probable that locating in the cities
 
and searching for a job would still have a positive payoff. These include delays
 
in conveying information to persons in rural areas, the preference of employers
 
for personal contact with prospective employees, the costs of repeated visits to
 
cities in search of work, and the simple fact that many jobs are found by
 
happening to be at the right place at the right time.
 
All these cotsiderations may be summarized by a single parameter. Should
 
an urban job become available, each urban resident would have some particular
 
chance of being selected for it and each rural resident would have some lesser
 
chance. Let the relative chance of any given rural worker obtaining the job re­
lative to any given urban worker be denoted by n. We shall call this number n
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the relative rural-urban Job search-parameter. It is 
an (inverse) index of the
 
payoff to job search; 
 when job search is profitable, n is low, and vice versa.
 
To give an example, suppose n n 1/2 and let the probability that a worker
 
who resides in the urban sector will obtain an urban job in the current period
 
be 0.8. 
Then, the probability that a comparable worker who lives in the rural
 
sector will obtain an urban job is 0.4. 
 Similarly, if n were equal to 1/4,
 
the probability of 
a rural worker securing an urban job would be 0.2.
 
The value of the rural-urban job-search parameter n In a given country
 
may be presumed to depend on a number of economic and cultural variables in­
cluding the lengtn of the work week in agriculture, the extent of favoritism,
 
nepotism, and discrimination in the labor market, and the efficiency of the
 
labor exchange.
 
We would expect that other things equal, the longer the work week, the
 
smaller the job-search parameter n. 
This is because a longer work week leaves
 
fewer hours for other activities including job search. 
 Thus, the longer the
 
work week, the poorer the relative chance of rural workers obtaining urban em­
ployment and so 
the lower the rural-urban job-search parameter.
 
The greater the degree of nepotism, favoritism, and discrimination in an
 
economy, the greater the expected job-search parameter. When these factors 
are
 
important, 
 one's contacts, skin color, tribal origin, or other personal
 
characteristics have a greater bearing on his employment status than the extent
 
of his job search. Members of the favored group could remain on the farm and
 
just wait to be called; their prospects would be little improved by migrating
 
to 
the city and searching full time; 
 Persons not in the favored group would
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have almost as poor a chnce of obtaining a job from the farm as they would in
 
the city where they are discriminated against; 
 their prospects also would be
 
little improved by full-time 
-ob-search in the city. Consequently, a high job­
search parameter would be expected where favoritism and discrimination are
 
prevalent.
 
Finally, an efficient labor exchange, in which most urban job openings
 
are filled by lotteries conducted by the labor exchange, would cause there to
 
be little payoff to job serarch and raise the Jcb search coefficient to near
 
unity. For instance, this was the case in Kenya during the Tripartite Agreement
 
of 1970, at which time all employers were required to increase employment by
 
ten percent, workers 
were required to register with the lcbor exchange, and the
 
lottery results were published in the daily press.
 
Let us now incorporate the generalized job-search formulation into the
 
Harris-Todaro model and determine the resulting effect on 
the equilibriun un­
employment rate. We shall denote the probability of a given urban resident be­
coming employed in an urban job by Pu' 
Assuming that all jobs are available to
 
all persons equally, 11
 
(6) P F 
U J 
u 
where E is urban employment and J
u u is the number of Job-seeker equivalents, 
defir 3d as follows. J is a weighted sum of the urban and rural labor forces,U 
the weights reflecting the relative chancec of being hired. Since each rural
 
resident has only an n'th as great a chance of being hired, a weight of one is
 
assigned to each urban resident and a weight of n to each rural resident.
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Letting Lu and La be the number of residents in the urban and rural areas 
respectively, we therefore have, by definition,
 
(7) 	 J L + nL .U u a 
J is called the number of job-seeker equivalents because the same number of
 
u 
urban residents as Ju and no rural residents would lea'e each with an equivalent
 
probability of finding urban employment.
 
The labor market just described may be thought of as functioning like a
 
lottery in which each urban resident (L ) has one ticket, each rural resident
u
 
(La) has an n'th of a ticket, each ticket is identical, each prize is equally
 
valuable, and the total number of pa!zes is E .
u 
The expected wage of a member of the urban labor force (E(W )) is simply

u 
the urban wage W times the probability of employment P :
u 	 U 
(8) E(W) W P W u 
uU U U 7­
u 
The expected income of a rural resident is slightly more involved, since
 
it depends on whether or not he is hired for an urban job. If he does obtain an
 
urban job, he will earn the urban wage Wu; otberwise he earns the rural wage Wa -

E 	 EThe respective probabilities 	are n u and 1 - n u . Therefore, the expected
3 J 
income of a member of the rural laborUforce is u 
(9) 	 E(W) Wu1 u + Wa ( - n Eu ).
 
g u
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The rural-urban migration equilibrium condition E(W ) E(W )
Uu aa
becomes
 
E E ~w (~ E 
(10) WU Ev.T - W n U E u T + W a (1 - n u 
u u u 
The situation described by the Harris-Todaro model is easily seen to be the 
case where n - 0. 
In order to determine the equilibrium employment rate, we solve the equili­
brium condition (10) for Eu . Substituting (7)for J and (L- Lu) for Lat 
L
 
where L is the total labor u force, we find
 
1 + n (L - 1)
(11) EUuE
 Lu
 
ih: WIT ~~_
u 
 u 
 W
 
a W
 
a
 
E 1- oeewhnarclua
 
In the Harris-Todaro case where n - 0, 	E_ W 1 However, when agricultural 
EL u 
w 
a 

1
 
workers have some chance of obtaining urban employment and n > 0, u > W
L u
 
u Wa
 
Furthermore, by differentiating (11) with respect to n, one can easily see that
 
the larger is n, the larger is the urban employment rate u . Thus we find
 
U 
that there is a lower equilibrium unemployment rate in general than -7ould be
 
predicted by the Harris-Todaro model and the greater the relative chance of rural
 
workers finding urban jobs, the greater the discrepancy between the general re­
sult and the Harris-Todaro result.
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3. The Introduction of a Murky Sector
 
The nature of the migration process and the resulting urban growth are
 
perhaps best described impressionistically by a typical scenario. 
New arrivals
 
in the cities ordinarily stay with friends or relatives who help house and feed
 
them while they look for work. A dozen or more people crowded into one 
room is
 
not uncommon. They need not 
live in housing which is rented or provided as part
 
of job compensation. 
Squatter settlements and shanty towns house a substantial
 
portion 
of urban populations, particularly in Africa.
 
Unemployment (by standard definitions) is not very common. Additional house­
hold members are expected to contribute to their sup-irt. Frequently, they assist
 
with the household chores by preparing meals, washing clothes, or caring for
 
children. Simultaneously, they search for work (albeit on an irregular basis)
 
and are classified as unemployed.
 
The most fortmnate new migrants obtain a permanent modern sector job as a
 
clerk, messenger, or whatever. However, these are the best jobs and the typical
 
migrant is forced to find some 
lesser means of earning a cash income. le may
 
secure one or more typically a succession of wage jobs (e.g., house-servant,
 
cook in a small lunch kiosk, assistant in a family shop)or engage In self-em­
ployment (e.g., 
selling produce, newspapers, curios, or shoe shines on 
the
 
street corner). These activities have been given several names 
including petty
 
capitalism, the traditional sector, the service sector, and the grey area. 
A
 
particularly graphic term, and the one we shall 
use to denote this whole range
 
of activities, is 
the ":murky sector."
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Entry into the murky sector is typically open. For instance, a person
 
can get started by buying some peas in the market, removing the pods at the
 
side of the road, and selling podded peas to passers-by a- a higher price.
 
Prostitution is another occupation which has notoriously easy -ry.
 
Workers in the murky sector are ordinarily classified as employed1 2 al­
though they themselves and the statisticians who measurn those things would
 
be inclined to consider them underemployed. An examination of available time
 
series evidence suggests that unemployment rates have not in general worsened
 
substantially over time. Of ten countries which permit analysis, unemployment
 
rates have risen 1 3 in three (Korea, Colombia, and Panamu), fallen in five (UAR,
 
Taiwan, Argentina, Chile, and Puerto Rico), and remained unchanged in 
two
 
(Philippines and Trinidad-Tobago).14 The tentative conclusion to be drawn is
 
that most migrants have encountered limited success and are engaged in some
 
sort of murky sector employment.
 
The existence of opportunities for paid employment in the murky Rector
 
gives each member of the labor force a new option. Not only can he choose be­
tween staying in (or returning to) agriculture or being either employed or un­
employed in the cities, but he can algo voluntarily choose to be underemployed
 
in the urban murky sector while looking for a better job.
 
Why don't all workers enter the murky sector? While underemployment in
 
the murky sector yields a positive wage and unemployment pays no wage, the
 
murky sector income is earned at the cost of reduced job search opportunities.
 
This may be simply because murky sector workers have less time to look for
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modern sector jobs or for some other reason. In the remainder of this section,
 
we shall examine these effects and show that introduction of the murky sector
 
leads to a lower equilibrium unemployment rate than the Harris-Todaro result.
 
The murky sector may be introduced in a manner similar to the development
 
of the agricultural sector in the last section. In order to keep the effects
 
of recognizing the murky sector separate, we return to the original model
 
(equations (1) - (5)) and assume that agricultural workers have no chance of
 
obtaining modern sector jobs.
 
We now have two kinds of urban jobs, modern sector and murky sector, with 
wage rates W and Wm respectively. While we will hold W constant as before, 
we will regard Wm as an endogenous variable to be determined by the model. 
Let the relative job search parameter between murky and mcdern sector jobs
 
he denoted by h. The parameter h is the probability that any given person in
 
the murky sector labor force would be hired for a modern sector job relative
 
to the probability of any given member of the modern sector labor force being
 
hired.
 
Since we are now assuming that rural residents have no chance of obtaining
 
urban jobs, the number of job-seeker equivalents for modern sector urban jobs
 
is
 
(12) J L + hL,
 
where Lu and L are the modern sector and tnurky sector labor forces respectively.
 
U m 
Equilibrium between the murky and modern sectors requires that the ex­
pczted wage in the modern sector (E(Wu)) equal the expected wage in the murky
 
sector (E(Wm)). 
By analogy with the expected agricultural wage under general
 
job sear:h conditions,
 
(13) 
 E(Wm )= W h Eu + ( - h EuW7- J m 
u 	 U 
As before,
 
(14) 	 E(W) E u.
 
Ju
 
Equilibrium between the rural and urban sectors requires that these in turt,
 
equal the expected agricultural wage (E(Wa)), which is
 
(15) E(Wa) . Was
 
since we are once again assuming that agricultural workers have no opportunity
 
of obtaining an urban job. Therefore, the rural-urban and intra-urban equilibrium
 
conditions may be combined as
 
(16) W - W h Eu E 
 E
a u + (1 - h u ) W = W u
 
m u
u 
u U 
We now wish to solve for the equilibrium labor force allocation, urban un­
employment rate, and murky sector wage rate. From the equality between the
 
first and third members of 	(16), in equilibrium,
 
(17) 	 j WuE
 
u uE
 
a 
Substituting this into the equality between the second and third members and
 
solving for W, we obtain for the equilibrium murky sector wage
 
(18) 	 Wa (1-h)
 
m
 
1 - h a
 
u
 
which is constant for particular values of W W , and h. 
a, 
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For the determination of the murky sector labor force, we assume that the
 
demand for murky sector output (Q.) is the sum of the demand by employed modern 
sector workers f(E ) plus the demand by murky sector workers iLm): 
m 
(19) Qm - f(Eu) + g(Lm), f'>O, g'>O. 
We further assume that since murky sector workers are underemployed, the demand
 
is supplied an4 the resultant income is shared equally among murky sector
 
workers, i.e.,
 
(20) W . °-m 
m 
Substituting (18) and (19) 
into (20), we obtain an implicit expression for the
 
murky sector labor force as
 
(21) [fVE I+ g(Lm)J - W (i-h) 
L W 
m 1-h a
 
W 
u 
In this general form, we cannot solve explicitly for L . However, if we adoptm 
the simplifying assumption that the amoun. of murky sector output demanded by
 
murky sector workers is fixed, this along with the assumed constancy of E
u 
implies that the total murky sector output is fixed at 
some level Qm . Substi­
tuting im for [f(Eu) + g(Lm)I in (21) and rearranging, we derive the murky
 
sector labor force as
 
(22) L - (1-h Wa)m W 
u
 
Wa (1-h)a 
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Substituting (22) and (17) into (12) and rearranging, we find that the total
 
urban labor force(Lur b ) is 
W 
WE
 
a 
The urban employment rate is modern sector employment plus murky sector em­
ployment divided by the total urban population:
 
E +L
(24) 	 u mLurb
 
Substituting (22) and (23) into (24), we find that the urban employment rate
 
is
 
+
 
(25) 	 u Wa (1-h) 
WE 	+ =
 
.u
 
W 
a 
where U. = n (1-h Wa ). This may readily be shown to be greater than Harris-
WU 
observing that the result is unambiguousyy positive. We have therefore demon­
strated the validity of the proposition that introduction of the murky sector
 
leads to a lower equilibrium unemployment rate than predicted by the Harris-

Todaro model.
 
What is the effect of the size of the murky-modern relative job search
 
parameter on the equilibrium urban employment rate and other labor market
 
variables? Our model suggests that the greater the chance of a worker employed
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in the murky sector of obtaining s modern sector job relative to an unemployed
 
worker who searches full-time. (i.e., the larger is h):
 
a) the smaller the equilibrium murky sector wage rate,
 
b) the larger the equilibrium murky sector labor force,
 
c) the smaller the modern sector labor force in equilibrium,
 
d) the smaller the total urban labor force in equilibrium,
 
and e) the larger the equilibrium urlan employment rate.
 
Point a) may be demonstrated by partially differentiating (18) with respect
 
to h
 
W 
(26) am M a (Wal 
u (1-hWa) 2 
W 
u 
and noting that the result is negative since WU > W a a To show b), differentiate 
(22)
 
W 
LW (l1 )J2(27 a m Wo 
 e)U1)ad(7 
and observe that the result is positive for W 	> W For c), (12) end (17)

;i a
 
give
 
(28) 
 Lu= WuEu -hL
 
W 
a 
which clearly varies inversely with h. 
Part d) is easily seen from the expression
 
for the equilibrium urban labor force in (23).
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Finally, differentiation of (16) with respect to h gives a constant J and
 
()w - W ) Eu
 m (Wu
(30) -, = ______ 
% 
 < 0. 
i-hr
-

U 
3L u 
(20) and (30) imply - > 0, which along with the constancy of J implies 
U h u 
that ---. 0. We now have more urban residents employed In the murky sector 
and fewer unemployed seekine modern sector unskilled jcbs and therefore an 
unambiguously higher urban employment rate for a larger value of h. 
A priori considerations suggest that the murky sector relative job search 
Darameter h would be fairly large, i.e., worker' job search activity would 
not be seriously impeded by taking a murky sector job rather than remaining 
unemployed in search of work in the modern sector. This would seem so for two 
reasons. First, the nature of the murky sector is such that self-employment, 
flexible hours, and part-time work are common. Thus, it is often possible to 
adapt one's work week and the specific work hours so as to be relatively free 
to search for modern sector jobs. Second, many modern sector jobs are obtained 
by contacts from employed friends or relatives. Consequently, workers would 
have relatively little to gain by searching full time and they would be more 
likely to take up employment in the murky sector in order to earn a cash Income. 
To the extent that these two considerations hold, urban unemployment rates are 
likely to be fairly low in absolute terms as well as relative to the prediction 
of the Harris-Todaro model. However, it should not be forgotten that these low 
unemployment rates conceal a considerable volume of underemployment in the
 
murky sector.
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As long as the murky sector labor force has some positive chance of be­
coming employed in the modern sector, the equilibrium murky sector wage would
 
1 5
be less than the agricultural wage. This would be expected because the
 
lower wage is the price workers must pay in equilibrium in order to have a
 
better chance of obtaining a relatively high-payinR modern sector job.
 
This gives an additional reason for the existence of an impoverished
 
urban class. Not only are some people willing to be unemployed much of the time
 
in order to earn high wages when they are employed in the modern sector, but
 
others are willing to be underemployed by working for very low wages (less even
 
than they could earn in agriculture) in order to have a better chance of being
 
hired for those same modern sector jobs.
 
4. Preferential Treatment by Employers of the Better Educated
 
A number of observers of lees developed countries report employers using
 
educational attainment as a criterion for hiring and selecting the better educated
 
in preference to those with less education. 1 6 What effect does this have on
 
the equilibrium employment rate?
 
Let us once again return to the original model and neglect the possibility
 
of employment in the murky sector. Now suppose there are two categories of
 
workers: the educated (L ) and uneducated (Lu), of whom Luu live in urban areas
 e

and La in agriculture. Suppose further that because of this systematic pre­
ference by employers the available supply of educated workers are hired im­
mediately without unemployment and uneducated workers must divide the remaining
 
jobs.
 
The expected income of art uneducated worker who enters the urban labor
 
force (E(WuI u)) is 
E -L 
(31) E(WI u) - W -eL 
and the expected income of an uneducated wo'!er who enters the agricultural
 
labor force (E(WuI a) is
 
(32) E(WuI a) - was 
Equilibrium between the two labor markets for uneducated workers requires that 
E(WuI u) - E(Wu a) or 
E-L 
(33) Wu e . u L a 
uu
 
The equilibrium employment rate for uneducated workers is
 
E-L 
(3)u e , 
-aL 

uu W_
 
u 
one. The total
and the equilibrium employment rate for educated workers is 

employment rate is a weighted average of these two rates, the weights given by
 
the percentage of uneducated and educated workers respectively. Therefore, the
 
total urban employment rate in equilibrium is
 
(35) L u__uW + Le Lur W L 
urb u urb
 
0.

which is clearly greater than the llarris-Todaro result ( a) except when 1, ­e 
u 
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The reason for this greater employment rate is inherent in the job search
 
mechanism itself. When an educated worker is hired, he fills a position which
 
some greater number of uneducated workers had been seeking. For example, if
 
rate for uneducated workers is I as given
a W , the equilibrium employment 
a 3 u 3 
by (34). For each educated worker who is hired preferentially, there is one
 
less urban job available to uneducated workers and in equilibrium there would
 
be three fewer job seekers.
 
5. Consideration of Labor Turnovei:
 
The basic Harris-Todaro model has been extended by Johnson (1971) to
 
17
 
Pive explicit attention to a time dimension and rate of labor turnover. As
 
before in choosing between the urban and rural sectors workers are assumed to
 
consider the expected incomes in each. Now, however, the present value of the
 
expected lifetime income streams are relevant. For a person in the urban labor
 
force, this is
 
T
 
(36) Vu of E(Wu)e - rtdt,
 
where T is his relevant time horizon, E(Wu ) is the expected urban wage which
 
varies over time, and r is a discount rate. While T and r have clear interpre­
tations, it is not at all obvious what the appropriate value of E(Wu ) is. Even
 
if we grant that the expected urbau,wage E(W ) at any time t in the "objective"
 
mathematically expected wage, t.e.,
 
(37) E(Wu) a Wu tu
 
where W is the urban wage at time t and 0 the probability of being employed
 
u U 
-21­
at that time, the appropriate future values of W 
and 0u are nonetheless sub­
jective. 
In this sense there are as many different expected urban incomes as
 
there are workers with different notions about future wages and employment
 
probabilities. 
If workers' behavior is standardized and we assume that all
 
workers behave as if today's wage and probability of finding employment will pre­
vail forever, Johnson shows that the expected probability of being employed at
 
any future time t is
 
(38) 0- Pu (1-e' U u) 
u -+0u 
where 0u is the rate of involuntary labor turnover Ln urban jobs. Substituting
 
(37) and (38) into (36) and integrating, for a sufficiently young worker with a
 
long time horizon (i.e., large value of T), the present value of expected urban
 
income is
 
W P (39) V U u
 
u r r+Pu+*u
 
Similarly, if agricultural workers are excluded from consideration for urban jobs
 
but always Lave the opportunity of earning the agricultural wage Wa the present
 
value of expected lifetime income in agriculture would be
 
T W
 
(40) 
 V - f W ert d --a .a 0 a r 
Rural-urban migration equilibrium requires that the expected present values
 in each labor force (Vu and Va) be equal. All terms expect Fu are parameters
 
of the model. Assuming randomness of hiring, Pu (the probability
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of finding an urban job) is the ratio of hires to Job-ceekers. Johnson shows
 
that the urban unemployment rate varies directly with the rate of labor turn­
over, provided the individual's discount rate exceeds the rate of growth of
 
urban employment. The Harris-Todaro model. has no job fixity, i.e., infinite
 
labor turnover, and therefore predicts a higher unemployment rate in equilibrium
 
than would be expected for any finite rate of labor turnover.
 
6. Conclusion
 
In this paper, we have sought to understand the determination of the equili­
brium level of unemployment in less developed countries. Following the precedent
 
established by !arris and Todaro, we have focussed on the voluntary movement
 
of workers between labor markets as the equilibrating force instead of the more
 
cunventional mechanism of wage adjustment. Within this framework of quantity
 
rather than price adjustment, we have taken into consideration four additional
 
factors: a more generalized account of the process of search for urban Jobs,
 
the possibility of underemployment in the so-called murky sector, the chance that
 
educaced workers might be favored by employers in job hiring, and recognition
 
of labor turnover in a multiperiod framework. We have shown that each of these
 
extensions implies a lower equilibrium unemployment rate than is predicted by
 
Harris and Todaro. Since urban unemployment rates are observed to be much lower
 
than the Harris-Todaro model predicts, these extensions permit us to retain the
 
quite plausible notion of quantity adjustment as the equilibrating mechanism
 
in labor markets and yet also have a theory which ls not contradicted by the
 
facts.
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In interpreting these results, one should not jump to the conclusion that
 
things are not (or will not become) as bad as the Harris-Todaro model might
 
have led us to believe. It is important that we remember that these unemploy­
ment rates fail to take into account employment at very low wages or the plight
 
of the working poor. Poverty is no less real when people eke out subsistence
 
in agriculture or earn less than a living wage while underemployed in the murky
 
sectors of the cities. In fact, the social consequences of a low unemployment
 
rate may be severe, for if planners and policy-makers mistakenly regard unem­
ployment rates of 10-20% as indicating that 80-90% of the urban population are
 
fully and gainfully employed, they may fail to act to increase earnings oppor­
tunities.
 
-24-

FOOTNOTES
 
1. See Turnham (1970, p. 107).
 
2. See Harris and Todaro (1970), Stiglitz (1969), and Frank (1971).
 
3. Especially Cugler ( 1964. 
4. 	Harris and Todaro (1970, p. 128).
 
5. 	Todaro (1971).
 
in 22 countries, Turnham
 6. 	On the basis of evidence from urban areas 

47) concludes that "in most cases the rate of unemployment among young
(1970, p. 
or more than double that applying to the labor force as a workers is double 
whole." 
7. See Sjaastad (1962) and Bowles (1970).
 
8. In our discussion we shall employ a somewhat different wage 
determina­
tion process from that of Harris and Todaro. The Harris-Todaro 
model fixes the
 
urban wage rate in real terms. The rural wage is specified 
as the marginal pro­
duct of labor in agriculture, which depends on the number 
of agricultural workers
 
and the terms of trade between agricultural products and manufactures. 
Harris
 
and Todaro specified the agricultural wage in this way in order 
to be able to
 
consider the welfare implications of various government policies 
with regard to
 
rural-urban migration in a general equilibrium framework. 
Since our present con­
cern is with employment and underemployment and other labor 
market conditions,
 
we shall subsequently treat the rural-urban terms of trade 
as contained in the
 
rural and urban wages and ignore changes in relative price 
levels. Furthermore,
 
we will treat the agricultural wage rate as fixed. While 
this is primarily for
 
expositional purposes, it is also likely that 	given the 
small size of the modern
 
urban sector compared to the agricultural sector, the wage 
e potential migrant
 
could earn in agriculture would vary to a relatively small 
extent over the rele­
vant 	range and can be treated as constant.
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9. Evidence for eight less developed countries (East Pakistan, Egypt,
 
Ivory Coast, Ceylon, Brazil, India, Philippines, and Venezuela) is given in
 
Turnham (1970, p. 77).
 
10. Turnham (1970, p. 57)
 
11. In subsequent sections we will distinguish between the total number of
 
jobs and the jobs for which hiring is taking place and between skilled and un­
skilled jobs and educated and uneducated workers.
 
12. Except for those engaged in Illegal activities which they do not report
 
to census enumerators.
 
13. From the first year the series is available until the last.
 
14. Turnham (1970, p. 46)
 
15. Under more general conditions whereby agricultural workers also have
 
some positive chance of obtaining modern sector employment, any value of h
 
(the murky-modern relative job search parameter),
 
greater than n (the rural-urban relative job search parameter) would pive the
 
same result.
 
16. For evidence on this point, see Blaug, Layard, and Woodhall (1969),
 
Krueger (1971), Skorov (1968), and unpublished data from the 1971 Nairobf House­
hold Survey.
 
17. This extension is described in some detail in my doctoral dissertation.
 
Johnson also extended the model to allow for the possibility that the urban em­
ployed might be expected to share part of their incomes with the unemployed,
 
but this is outside the scope of the present discussion.
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